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Abstract: I have no doubt that Covaleskie's commentary was well- intentioned. Nonetheless, it is
seriously flawed. In this response I shall identify the numerous instances of inaccurate and
incomplete data, as well as invalid reasoning, upon which his conclusion is based.
1. The State of Public Schooling
Citing Berliner and Bracy, Covaleskie claims that public schools are not failing and so are not in
need of systemic reform. The two authors draw primarily from the same sources, so it is
sufficient to focus on the work of Berliner. His principal arguments are discussed below.
1.1 Indicators of National Educational Performance
1.1.1 The SAT
The SAT-taking population has become increasingly diverse over time. Based on this
observation, it is argued that the sole cause of the decline in overall average scores has been the
participation of increasing numbers of lower- scoring students. Berliner offers as evidence a table
of average SAT scores by ethnic group, for the years 1975 and 1990. There are three fatal flaws
with his argument: the historical SAT scores he cites are incorrect, SAT scores have declined
dramatically at the top as well as on average, and most of the decline in SAT scores took place
prior to 1975.
To show that the average SAT score has been lowered solely by an increase in the number of
non-White test- takers, it is necessary to demonstrate that the scores of Whites were constant or
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improving during the given period. Berliner's table does just that, revealing a gain in the mean
SAT score of Whites from 930 in 1975 to 945 in 1990 [1]. These scores are not accurate. The
mean White SAT score actually fell from 944 in 1975-76 to 930 in 1990-91 (U.S. Department of
Education (1), 1993, p.126). None of the other SAT scores in Berliner's table are accurate either.
His figure for the 1990 average score of Mexican- Americans is fully 26 points higher than the
true value. It seems that he estimated his numbers from a graph in an unpublished report by
Sandia National Laboratories, and it has been suggested that the graph was grossly inaccurate [2].
Whatever the cause of the error, the true data show a decline in the average White score,
contradicting Berliner's claim.
Another important fact which cannot be explained by the diversity hypothesis, and which
Berliner neglects to mention, is that SAT scores have fallen not only on average but also at the
top. More than 112,000 students scored above 600 on the verbal SAT in 1972, but that number
had dropped to less than 72,000 by 1990, even though 3,000 more students took the test in that
year (U.S. Department of Education (2), 1993, p. 243). In other words the number of top-scoring
students decreased by more than a third. This decline is approximately three times larger than the
decrease in the proportion of White test-takers (U.S. Department of Education (2), 1993, p. 244),
and so only a fraction of it can possibly be accounted for by changing ethnic composition. From
the 60's to the `80s, verbal and quantitative SAT scores dropped at top-ranked institutions across
the country such as Yale, Princeton, Cal Tech, the University of Chicago, Oberlin, Rice,
Brandeis, Carleton, Pomona, Reed, Whitman, and Davidson, to name a few (Sowell, 93, p. 9).
Finally, the ethnicity argument fails to address the most significant period of decline. Between
1966-67 and 1975-76, overall average SAT scores fell by 55 points (U.S. Department of
Education (1), 1993, p.126). The first year for which data on the ethnic composition of test-takers
are available is 1975-76. To summarize, the ethnicity argument is not only contradicted by the
decline in top scorers and in the White average during the period for which the relevant data are
available, these data only appear after most of the fall in scores had already taken place.
1.1.2 The NAEP
The other national educational barometer given as a sign of public schooling's success is the
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). This series of tests in a variety of subject
areas is periodically given to samples of 9, 13 and 17 year-olds. Taken as a whole, the results of
these tests have been constant since they began in the 1970s. There are three reasons to consider
this a serious problem rather than a sign of success: the SATs indicate that educational
performance had already fallen during the 1960's, public school spending has increased
dramatically in the past few decades, and knowledge of how to improve academic achievement
has been available, yet ignored. Having already discussed SAT scores, let us consider rising
costs.
While the NAEPs have on the whole shown no improvement, inflation-adjusted per-pupil
spending has tripled since 1959- 60 (U.S. Department of Education (1), 1993, p.52). A rapid rise
in costs unaccompanied by gains in quality or output signals gross inefficiency. This inefficiency
is manifested in a variety of ways, many of which are described in my paper (Coulson, 1994).
The 33 percent drop in average class size that has taken place during this thirty-year period is one
example (U.S. Department of Education (1), 1993, p. 74). As explained in my section entitled
"Class Size", reductions in the pupil-teacher ratio down to 15 or even 10, have no significant
academic benefits. This policy alone is wasting approximately $35 billion dollars a year [3].
Enough to pay for a significant number of educationally effective programs, such as the ones
described below.
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Tremendous advances have been made in information technology over the past three decades,
such as personal computers, electronic databases, and high-speed, high- bandwidth digital
networks. These advances alone could reasonably be expected to increase the effectiveness of
teachers, were they more widely used. In addition to technological innovations, leaps have been
made in educational research as well. The combination of many new primary studies with
statistical survey (meta-analysis) techniques, has produced numerous important findings. It is
now clear, for instance, that children can learn approximately one third more when they are
taught at a speed tailored to their aptitude, than they can in traditional mixed-ability classes
(Kulik, 1992). Even more impressively, bright students in enriched and accelerated classes are
able to learn between 50 and 100 percent more than they can in regular classrooms (Ibid.).
Educational research in peer-tutoring and computer-assisted learning also offer the potential for
significant academic gains. Little of this research is applied in public school classrooms. Given
the dramatic increases in public school spending, and the failure to effectively apply technology
and educational research, the stagnation of NAEP results cannot be seen as a success.
1.2 International Indicators of Educational Performance
It is well known that American children perform poorly on international tests. Berliner's answer
to this uncomfortable truth is two-fold: the tests might not be fair, and we can't expect to do any
better. He fails to make the case for unfairness. His argument is that, on occasion, American
children have not yet studied a given topic (e.g. geometry, algebra, etc.) by the same age as their
foreign peers, making them unprepared for questions on that topic. If it were only a question of
studying topics in a different order from other nations, one would expect that American children
would come out about average in the subject of mathematics as a whole. In fact, American
children perform near the bottom in mathematics (U.S. Department of Education (1), 1993, p.
414-415). In those cases when American performance is above average, it is usually only for the
youngest children; the more time children spend in the system, the more poorly they perform.
Nine year-old American children placed third of 10 nations in a 1991 science test, but thirteen
year-olds placed 12th out of 14 in the same year (Ibid, p. 417). It can be concluded therefore that
either American schooling is less effective in teaching most subjects, or that it is slower in
covering them than most other countries. These are both indictments of America's school system.
Berliner's second contention, that American culture is limiting childrens' performance to the
current low levels, is also false. As noted in the previous section, there are numerous practices
that have been shown to improve academic achievement, but that the public schools have
essentially ignored.
1.3 Efficiency
According to Childs and Shakeshaft, who reviewed 467 studies of public school
cost-effectiveness, the correlation between public school spending and student performance has
been low and declining over the past half-century (1986). It has been insignificant (and actually
negative) since the 1970's. Similar results have been obtained in meta-analyses by Hanushek
(1986 & 1989). Berliner makes no mention of these results in his discussion of the subject.
Instead, he describes those who acknowledge the inefficiency of public- schooling as
"uninformed taxpayers and politicians" (1993). Indeed virtually none of the evidence of
public-schooling's inefficiency is dealt with in Berliner's paper. Rather than repeat all of that
evidence here, the interested reader is encouraged to review the "Class Size", "Unproductive
Bureaucracy", "Textbooks and their selection", and "Organizational Effectiveness", sections of
my paper.
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2. Parent Satisfaction With Local Public Schools
Covaleskie's second attempt at establishing the health of public schooling is to observe that most
parents are satisfied with their local public schools. Far from being a sign of health, this is one of
the most pernicious symptoms of the public school monopoly. In a cross-national study
conducted by Harold Stevenson of the University of Michigan, American parents were found to
be the most satisfied with their local schools, while their children had the lowest performance
(1992, p. 72). These same parents were nonetheless aware that American children are generally
less well educated than their foreign peers. What might account for the fact that parents are better
informed about national educational performance than they are about the performance of their
local schools? The answer is obvious: while our nation's dismal results on international tests
frequently make the headlines, individual schools are rarely subject to such comparisons. The
public school system simply does not inform parents of individual school failings.
This information vacuum is caused by the absence of competition. In a competitive market, each
enterprise must demonstrate its own strengths and its competitors' weaknesses in order to
succeed, so information about the failings of individual businesses is far more efficiently
communicated. From automobiles to telephone services, competitors constantly compare
themselves by quality and price. Not only do quality and efficiency drop when competition is
stifled, but the information flow that would otherwise convey this decline dries up as well. This
leaves us with the sad result revealed by Stevenson's experiment, a nation whose children are
being poorly educated and whose parents don't even know it. Surely not a sign of health.
3. Organizational Effects on Human Action
Covaleskie spends a great deal of time criticizing the view that human beings are strictly
concerned with their own short term gratification. This criticism is beside the point. The theory
of human action I have presented, that human beings pursue what they value, embraces the idea
that the well-being of others can have a powerful effect on ourselves and our actions. Clearly
most people value the health and happiness of their loved ones, and even of strangers. The real
issue is how our actions are affected by the incentive structures of different organizations.
Compare a situation in which actions that benefit others are injurious to us, versus one in which
those same actions benefit us as well. In which of these two situations are people more likely to
pursue the actions that benefit others?
To take a concrete example, let us turn to the issue of class size. The statistical evidence shows
that smaller pupil/teacher ratios, unless they reach impossibly low levels, are of no significant
benefit to student performance (Odden, 1990). Despite this fact, and despite the fact that there are
many more educationally effective and less costly practices, the public school system roundly
favors class size reduction. Research shows that smaller classes increase teacher morale and
reduce teacher workload. Because public school teachers are not rewarded for better
teaching--their working conditions and salaries depend on seniority not performance--they
personally lose out if they advocate alternatives to reduced class size. That is to say, they face
lower morale and larger workloads, with no systemic compensation for the loss. The implication
here is not that teachers, any more than other individuals, respond immediately and uniformly to
the systemic incentives of their workplace, but simply that these incentives exist and necessarily
exert some influence on their decision-making.
Compare this incentive structure to that of a free and competitive market. In such a system, the
success of a school would depend on its ability to demonstrate the greatest gains for its clientele.
With this success would come higher teacher salaries and better working conditions. Thus, while
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public sector teachers have to suffer in order to adopt more educationally effective practices in
this situation, teachers in the for-profit sector would gain from doing so. The question the reader
must answer is: Which of these two scenarios is more likely to yield a decision that benefits the
students? In answering this question, it should be kept in mind that public schools do in fact
support class size reduction, reducing the amount of money that can be spent on academically
useful practices. It must also be noted that in other industries the introduction or increase of
competition has been shown to increase quality and reduce costs at both the national (Winston,
1993) and the local (Kent, 1987) levels. Finally, the personal value that teaching professionals
place on improving their students' performance is constant across these two systems.
Another recurrent theme in Covaleskie's reply is that, because government provision of schooling
ostensibly results in "presumptive obligations to improve the conditions of the disadvantaged", it
should be preferred to a private system. This argument ignores the fact that a competitive
educational market in which poor families are given vouchers, shows just as much concern for
their welfare as does the institution of public schooling. The primary change is simply the means
of delivery. In fact, such a system would show a far more genuine concern for the welfare of the
disadvantaged because it would provide them with a better quality of education than the current
system is capable of offering. Public schools have failed the inner city. The problems I have
enumerated in my paper are at their severest in districts serving the poor and disenfranchised.
The situation has gotten so bad that many of this country's poorest families have been scraping
together enough money to pay for private schooling for their children, often when the only
private schools available to them are of a different faith. These problems, as I have argued, are
not incidental to government provision, they are caused by it. In order to truly improve the
education of the poor it is necessary to substitute the demonstrably more effective competitive
market for the current bureaucratic monopoly.
4. Competition vs. Monopoly
Covaleskie attempts to refute the benefits of competition by arguing that, while capitalism has
lead to higher standards of living than alternative social systems, it does so at the expense of the
poorer members of the population. He claims that, "The fact remains that under unregulated
capitalism, the rich do get richer and the poor do get poorer". This is false.
While there has never been a completely unregulated capitalist economy, the United States is
among the least regulated. Let us take as an example, therefore, the changes in American income
distribution over time, adjusted for inflation. The period between 1929 and 1957 is perhaps the
earliest for which reliable information is available. In 1929, 41.5 percent of households earned
less that $2000 a year (incomes are given in 1950 dollars). In 1957, only 17.3 percent of
households earned below that amount. While only 20.6 percent of households were earning more
than $4000 in 1929, 54.6 percent were doing so by 1957 (U.S. Bureau of the Census (1), 1975, p.
300). These figures reflect a substantial real increase in earnings at both high and low income
levels; much of the population that would have been considered poor joined the ranks of the
middle class and the wealthy. Furthermore, this period was not exceptional. Similar gains were
enjoyed between 1947 and 1970 (Ibid, p. 290), and they have continued, though far more
modestly, from 1970 to the present (U.S. Bureau of the Census (2), 1993, p. 457). This
broadly-enjoyed increase in economic welfare is in stark contrast with the fate of former Soviet
citizens who suffered under an uncompetitive, centrally planned economy. As the reader is no
doubt well aware, that system reduced virtually all its citizens to poverty.
A second economic fallacy presented by Covaleskie is that "there is ongoing competition in
capitalism only because of government intervention in the market". In general, the converse is
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true. The reduction of government intervention, through deregulation and privatization, has been
shown to increase competition, reduce prices, and increase efficiency. Those readers wishing to
see the evidence first hand are encouraged to read the works by Kent and Winston already cited,
which in turn reference numerous corroborating studies.
The root of Covaleskie's misconception is probably the idea of technical monopoly, in which
inherent characteristics of an industry make it difficult or impossible for more than one producer
to operate simultaneously. In practice technical monopolies are rare (Friedman, 1982, p. 28), and
the conditions for technical monopoly do not exist in the education industry, where entry costs
are relatively low and the basic resources (instructional materials) are widely available.
5. Choice
Covaleskie's primary argument against choice is that some parents may chose unwisely. Were
there an alternative system peopled by supremely wise and intelligent decision makers who not
only knew each child as well as his or her parents, but also sought what was best for each and
every child, this argument might have some credence. No such alternative exists. The choice is
between fallible parents and fallible civil servants, where parents generally care more about their
own children than civil servants care about those of others, and in which the responsibility for
raising children belongs to the parents and not to the State. For these reasons the decision must
be left to the parents, unless they demonstrate negligence in some recognized way.
Even if Covaleskie were correct in believing that public school employees are somehow wiser
and more well- meaning than parents, it would imply a shift towards privatization, not a
maintenance of the current government- run system. In all thirteen of the cities studied in a 1984
survey, public school teachers were significantly more likely to send their children to private
school than the average parent (Boaz, 1991). In Chicago, the rate was more than double. The
flaw in his argument becomes clearer yet when we realize that there is no substantial distinction
between educational choices and many other important choices in a child's life. If parents should
not be allowed to make the educational decisions for their children, there is no reason to allow
them to choose their childrens' diets, religions, or even to make the decision to have children in
the first place.
This unfounded advocacy of government rule over educational choices continues in Covaleskie's
prediction of scholastic junk-food peddlers. While he expects hordes of individual parents to
seek out such shoddy schools, "the polity", composed of none other than these very same
individuals, is predicted to "have good reason to not want to invest in this sort of school". There
is no magic spell which mysteriously grants heightened intelligence to collective decisions.
Majority rule is a tool for compelling conformity when it is necessary for the survival of a
society, such as in foreign policy or laws restricting the use of physical force. As I demonstrated
in "Human Life, Human Organizations and Education", the coerced conformity of public
schooling is not only unnecessary but has actually been inimical to the health of our society.
Conclusion
Covaleskie's commentary fails to address virtually any of the evidence presented in my paper. He
ignores the dozens of statistical research studies cited therein, and cavalierly dismisses them as
"the anecdotes [I offer] to suggest systemic failure". His few attempts at countering the evidence
are based, as I have shown, on false or incomplete information and invalid arguments. My
conclusion to this response is therefore identical to the conclusion of my original article:
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The same voluntary cooperation and free competition which have raised the standard
of living of free countries the world over should be harnessed for the benefit of this
country's children. Such a system, when coupled with educational vouchers to assist
families with limited means, could provide a higher quality of education for every
child, not simply for the wealthy.
Footnotes
1. The SAT data collected by the College Entrance Examination Board, and published by the
National Center for Education Statistics, is usually given by scholastic year (e.g. 1975-76) rather
than calendar year (e.g. 1975). Berliner, however, uses calendar years for his data. An ambiguity
therefore arises as to whether 1975 refers to the 1974-75 or the 1975-76 scholastic year. This
ambiguity is resolved by noting that SAT ethnicity breakdowns were not available prior to
1975-76.
2. Berliner cites the third draft of the SNL report as his source. The published version (Carson et
al, 1993, p. 274), contains a reasonably accurate graph that diverges sharply from the figures in
Berliner's table. Berliner is out of the country as this article goes to press, and unavailable for
comment. Gene Glass, editor of EPAA, has suggested in a personal communication that the data
presented by Sandia National Laboratories in their third draft was erroneous, and that it was
corrected in the published version. Unfortunately, no mention of changes to the data appears in
the Preface to that publication.
3. In 1990-91, public school instructional staff numbered 3,051,000. The average salary of
instructional staff was $34,410 (U.S. Department of Education (1), 1993, p. 51-52). The total
salary cost for instructional staff was therefore approximately $105 billion. If class size had
remained constant, the instructional staff would be only two thirds of its present size, for a
difference of approximately $35 billion dollars a year.
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